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Abstract:  
Environmental regulation in middle-income and developing countries is often viewed 
with high degrees of pessimism.  Although many countries have adopted protective laws, 
violations are widespread and institutions are weak.  This paper analyzes the puzzle of 
shifting patterns of environmental regulation in Argentina, a country with widespread 
institutional weakness.  Most regulators in Argentina take a firefighting approach, acting 
only when skirmishes emerge between communities and firms.  Amidst regulatory chaos, 
improvements in the environmental performance of firms are few, and noncompliance 
remains the norm.  However, in the province of Tucumán, the pattern of regulation 
shifted, and officials began to systematically enforce regulations.  This paper traces shifts 
in patterns of enforcement back to broad pressures that provoked industry and 
environmentalists to support increases in the internal and external components of state 
regulatory capacity.  The analysis uncovers political dynamics that can contribute to 
strengthening the institutions necessary for sustainable development.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 Environmental regulation in middle-income and developing countries is often 
viewed with high degrees of pessimism.  Although many countries have adopted 
protective laws on the books, their regulatory institutions do not effectively structure the 
actions of firms.1  There is near consensus that such a broad institutional failure is 
problematic.  For those concerned with environmental and social protection, the inability 
of policies to meet even remotely their stated ends exposes society and the environment 
to immediate and illegal harms.2  For those focused on the detrimental developmental 
consequences of the weak rule of law, the resulting uncertainty is a potential drag on 
investment.3  A central task for many countries, therefore, is to escape chaotic regulation, 
wherein formal policies play a limited role and firms react directly to unmediated 
pressures from society.  Despite this widespread challenge, research to date has given us 
few roadmaps towards more capable regulatory states that can render institutions strong 
enough to support sustainable development.   
 This paper analyzes the puzzle of shifting patterns of environmental regulation in 
Argentina, a country that shares many of the common pathologies of chaotic 
environmental regulation.4  The agencies charged with enforcement suffer from both 
political interference and extremely limited resources.  This article demonstrates that 
despite the many constraints facing Argentine regulators, there are distinct patterns of 
enforcement and the state is not completely absent.  Some regulators take a firefighting 
approach to enforcement, acting only when skirmishes emerge between communities and 
firms.  In the province of Santa Fe, for instance, highly constrained regulators helped 
resolve a conflict surrounding pollution from an agro-industrial plant. Although such 
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actions reduce pollution and protest, regulation remains highly chaotic and such 
improvements are not broad or sustained. 
By contrast, regulators in other parts of the country have overcome constraints 
and been able systematically to enable and incentivize entire industries to reduce 
pollution.  As is described in detail below, such a shift took place in the province of 
Tucumán, where the state began to establish regulatory capacity and went beyond 
piecemeal action.  Changes in Tucumán did not follow the traditional pathway of 
insulating the regulatory agency,5 but rather involved hiring technical staff and forming 
ties to society that allowed both business and environmental groups to exercise political 
influence and to provide regulators with resources.  Notwithstanding these departures 
from standard reforms, regulators contributed to environmental improvements and helped 
key industries adjust when their social licenses to operate were threatened.6  In short, 
Tucumán began to move towards stronger institutions that could provide for structured 
pollution reduction and, ultimately, more sustainable development. 
 This paper makes two principal contributions.  First, it shows that there are 
distinct patterns of enforcement even in places that lack the traditional features of state 
capacity.  Second, it offers an explanation for shifts in patterns of enforcement.  The 
analysis holds that firefighting enforcement is the result of regulators relying heavily on 
leveraging external resources (e.g. mobilized community groups) in order to supplement 
their own meager internal resources (e.g. staff and budget).  To strengthen institutions 
through systematic enforcement, states must have both internal and external components 
of capacity that jointly allow regulators to undertake systematic enforcement.  Conflict 
that threatens an industry’s ability to operate can create a pathway toward increasing state 
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capacity by generating interest among a range of businesses for capable intermediaries 
(even if business continues to oppose stringent standards).  When business support is 
combined with continued social conflict, regulators can gain the capacity to strengthen 
institutions and guide industry towards upgrading.  This argument helps to advance 
studies of regulation in industrializing countries by moving the focus of inquiry beyond a 
narrow view of businesses and environmental groups fighting only over pollution 
reduction and short-term economic gain, and towards an analysis of the politics of 
institutional strengthening.7   
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections and a conclusion.  The 
following section reviews debates on environmental regulation in industrializing 
countries, focusing on the important differences in patterns of enforcement apparent in 
the literature.  Laying out the argument in more detail, this section also provides a 
framework for analyzing the politics of state capacity and institutional strengthening.  
The second section sets the stage in Argentina, describing the weak institutional 
landscape and the problems it generates from the perspective of firms, environmental 
groups, and regulators.  The third and fourth sections examine enforcement in two 
provinces, showing how in Santa Fe firefighting was stable, in contrast to changes in the 
pattern of enforcement in Tucumán. These case studies are based on data gathered over 
sixteen months of field research in Argentina in 2008 and 2009, which includes over 110 
semi-structured interviews8 (with regulators, environmental organizations, firms, and 
political leaders) and extensive documentary evidence (e.g. inspection reports, 
agreements between firms and regulators, NGO investigations, and a review of over 
1,300 articles in provincial newspapers related to environmental regulation).   
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Patterns of Environmental Regulation  
Studies of environmental regulation in industrializing countries often paint a bleak 
picture of unmitigated pollution.9  A number of factors are blamed for the lack of 
attention to environmental issues, including a political priority of economic growth over 
environmental protection, weak environmental movements, and competition created by 
international trade.10  One of the most immediate constraints is the lack of state capacity 
to implement policies.  For many observers, the absence of functioning command and 
control systems is interpreted as a regulatory void.  However, researchers have found that 
even weak states can undertake firefighting enforcement.  For instance, O’Rourke 
identified “community-driven” regulation in Vietnam, by which citizen mobilization 
enables regulators who induce industry to mitigate pollution.  O’Rourke argues that this 
model is the “best hope for advancing environmental protection” in places with weak 
states that are “conflicted” between economic growth and sustainable development.11   
There is broad agreement, however, that there are serious limitations to such 
chaotic regulation.12  Community pressure is fickle, creating high levels of uncertainty 
and exacerbating inequalities.  Moreover, firms cannot count on the support of the state to 
help manage unpredictable demands for pollution mitigation.  And, when firms lose their 
social licenses to operate13 and cannot adapt, pushes for pollution reduction are 
detrimental to economic development.14  In short, the persistence of chaotic regulation 
and the dominant pattern of firefighting by states undermine environmental, economic, 
and social goals.  
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There are, however, alternative patterns of enforcement in industrializing 
countries with the potential to strengthen institutions.15  For instance, state regulators in 
Brazil played a key role in cleaning up the Cubatão through systematic enforcement.16 
With help from their allies in society, they shifted industry away from a norm of 
noncompliance.  Ultimately, they substantially reduced continuation on a regional scale.  
In this and other cases, researchers have found evidence that regulatory institutions can 
be strengthened.  Behind these changes are state agencies that go beyond firefighting and 
that systematically enforce regulations, enabling and pressuring entire industries to 
upgrade towards compliance.  
A key question, therefore, is what leads to shifts in patterns of regulation towards 
systematic enforcement that ultimately strengthen institution that support sustainable 
development?  The dominant ways of examining environmental regulation that 
emphasize conflict between firms and environmental groups over pollution as the key 
mode of politics offer few answers to this question.  Much of the literature locates 
environmental upgrading either as part of a strategy of “green firms,”17 or immediate 
community demands,18 or the sometimes positive effects of international trade.19  The 
state and institutional strength have been sidelined from dominant analyses.20  Studies 
that have identified improvements in environmental policy implementation have sought 
to explain them through large structural changes, such as democratization.21  As a result, 
notwithstanding the literature’s advances, research has offered little in terms of 
unpacking the interest of key actors regarding institutional strength, and has not 
developed an account of the local politics that can make developmental regulation 
possible. 
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This paper proposes a framework for explaining changes in state capacity and in 
patterns of enforcement.  First, as previewed in the introduction, this paper identifies the 
combinations of internal and external components of state capacity that are behind 
distinct patterns of enforcement.22  In the firefighting pattern, weak internal components 
of state capacity (e.g. staff, budgets, and expertise) limit state action, but enforcement is 
made possible when regulators are able to leverage external resources (e.g. mobilized 
community groups).  In cases of systematic enforcement, external and internal 
components of state capacity are combined.  Therefore, the central challenge is to 
discover processes through which both components increase simultaneously. 
One pathway to investment in both components of state capacity is triggered by 
conflict at an industry scale that undermines the efficacy of firefighting.  Whereas 
conflicts between communities and individual firms can be resolved by regulators with 
weak internal capacity, larger conflicts make it impossible for regulators to respond 
without substantial internal capacity.  The immediate effect of such an industry-wide 
threat is a dramatic increase in uncertainty for all firms (including lead firms) that see 
their social license to operate threatened en mass.  Under these conditions, industry’s 
alternative to capable regulators is direct pressures from mobilized society or courts to 
reduce pollution, a situation that creates substantial risks.  As a result, industry broadly 
favors the strengthening of state regulatory bodies that can broker the upgrading process, 
and firms seek to build linkages to potential allies in the state.  In short, although the 
position of industry towards the strictness of regulations may remain unmoved (industry 
might continue to prefer deregulation above all other options), its position towards 
regulators who can help with adjustments to societal demands shifts from ambivalence to 
 7 
support.  Under these conditions, the risk that a regulator might take actions that are 
unfavorable to business becomes less daunting than a wave of unmediated social conflict 
and judicial action.  This change lends crucial political backing for allocating scarce 
resources to the internal components of state capacity that can lead to orderly regulation.  
Increased resources and ties to business alone are insufficient, especially in 
contexts with high levels of state politicization.23  Regulators also need to build ties to 
environmental groups that can bring key political and operational resources.  Ongoing 
small conflicts (in addition to the industry-wide threat) open political space for regulators 
to build linkages with environmental groups, primarily as a way of channeling demands 
out of the streets and into regulatory institutions.  These ties help environmental groups 
act as countervailing powers to business, and to further augment the operational reach of 
the state.  In sum, threats to entire industries can trigger processes that result in 
strengthening the two constituent parts of state capacity—1) internal capabilities within 
regulatory agencies, and 2) ties between regulators and environmental organizations—
and thereby shifting patterns of enforcement.   
This argument builds on research on upgrading and standards, which identifies 
external shocks—such as the imposition of global standards that break the “devil’s deals” 
underpinning chaotic regulation in many contexts—as key drivers of change.24  It departs, 
however, from dominant approaches to studying environmental regulation in 
industrializing countries by providing an account of pathways out of the low compliance 
equilibrium.  In doing so, it illuminates the differences between conflicts that are part of 
chaotic regulation and those that create the opportunities for changes in enforcement 
patterns.  Moreover, it focuses on how actors strengthen (or weaken) institutions, instead 
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of solely analyzing fights over trade-offs between economic growth and environmental 
protection.  In other words, the argument moves away from the view that firms 
universally resist regulatory capacity due to the costs associated with compliance, which 
has obscured the interest firms have in state assistance in the face of new social 
demands.25  By contrast, it shows that conflicts over pollution abatement in the short-term 
can be qualitatively different from the politics of regulatory capacity, a key distinction 
that has been overlooked in the dominant debates.  With a wider lens on the politics of 
regulation and a broader sense of what regulators do in practice, it becomes possible to 
identify conditions under which various actors support, rather than undermine, 
development of state regulatory capacity.  
Chaotic Regulation in Argentina  
Argentina’s environmental regulatory institutions were born weak.26  Juan 
Domingo Perón created the first environmental agency in 1973, but it was quickly 
dismantled by the military government in 1976.  In the 1990s and early 2000s, there was 
an explosion of national initiatives to promote sustainable development; President Carlos 
Saúl Menem recreated the federal environmental agency, a major constitutional reform 
that included the right to a clean environment, and Congress passed laws that created 
minimum standards for pollution across provinces.27  These policies, however, were 
largely unenforced, and the environmental agency charged with implementing them was 
plagued by corruption scandals.28 
Notwithstanding a proliferation of national policies, the federal nature of 
Argentine institutions left much of the power to regulate industrial pollution to the 
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provinces.  Federalism added additional dysfunction to the institutions.  A World Bank 
study, for example, found that “the most critical constraint for improving the 
management of pollution in Argentina is the absence of clear institutional 
responsibility . . . and the lack of effective enforcement.”29  Another important impact of 
federalism was to create a wide range of variation in environmental policy 
implementation across provinces.  Some provinces formed agencies and adopted 
regulations early on; for instance, in 1985,  soon after the return to democracy, Córdoba 
created a Subsecretariat of Environmental Management and passed a General 
Environmental Law.30  Most other provinces, however, lagged behind, leaving 
environmental functions spread out over a variety of government agencies, such as public 
health, water, and industry.  
Argentine environmental institutions have never functioned in the way that any 
major group would support.  For firms, the problem is uncertainty.  An official in a large 
provincial firm association in Santa Fe remarked, “What industry is looking for is legal 
certainty” from environmental regulations.31  Similarly, a leader in a small metal 
manufacturing association in Buenos Aires lamented that the problem is “judicial 
insecurity” created by environmental regulations.32  Indeed, on multiple occasions, 
individual plants have been shut down after being singled out by mobilized community 
groups for violations that are likely pervasive.33  In addition, the firefighting nature of 
enforcement exerts unequal pressure on firms.  An official in the province of Córdoba’s 
major industry association noted that the principal problem with environmental laws is 
that regulators act like they are “hunting in a zoo;” they “inspect the firms that are trying 
to do the right thing, but not those that are informal.”34  In Buenos Aires, a business 
 10 
leader representing meat packing firms complained about “illegal competition” from 
completely informal firms that easily fly below the radar of regulators.35  In sum, even 
firms that are at best ambivalent about investing in pollution reduction are clearly 
interested in reducing the uncertainty of chaotic regulation.  One way of reducing 
uncertainty is through reducing standards, but, as I show below, this option is not always 
on the table when there is widespread conflict. 
Unsurprisingly, for environmental groups, chaotic regulation is seen as a complete 
disaster.36  A community group that mobilized against contamination in its working-class 
neighborhood in the city of Buenos Aires argued that in Argentina, “development isn’t 
sustainable; firms don’t comply with regulations, the state doesn’t make them comply, 
and if there isn’t an enforcement authority, firms are just going to do what they can to 
save money.”37  A report by a leading environmental NGO found that “the absolute 
absence of enforcement by the state, irresponsibility on the majority of the private sector, 
and general apathy contributed to…environmental crisis.”38  The running narrative 
throughout the discourse holds that extensive non-compliance, rather than environmental 
laws,  remains the key bottleneck. 
For those in charge of implementing policies, the tremendous gap between 
regulatory standards and practice is highly problematic.  One head of a provincial 
regulatory agency complained, “What has happened in Argentina…is that it is really easy 
to pass a law ….  Today the Internet even gives us the ability to see and copy whatever 
are the best laws from the United States Environmental Protection Agency or the 
European Union . . . .   This is a defect in our regulatory framework . . . .   In some cases 
Argentina has stricter rules than the EU and USA.”39  In a similar statement, an official 
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in an environmental agency from another province stated that the law of environmental 
impact assessments “was practically copied from what was one of the first environmental 
impact laws in Spain.”40  These environmental laws are seen as “impossible” for local 
firms to comply with because they are designed for advanced industrial countries.  As a 
result, regulators are left to pick up the pieces of conflicts between industry and 
environmental groups.  In short, notwithstanding the broad consensus in favor of 
reducing regulatory chaos, chaos still remains in most of Argentina.   
There has been, however, substantial variation in the responses of provincial 
governments to the problems generated by regulatory chaos.  The following sections 
analyze enforcement in the provinces of Santa Fe and Tucumán during the growth period 
following the financial crisis of 2001 to help bring into relief the processes that prevent, 
and produce, changes in patterns of environmental regulation.  The pairing of Santa Fe 
and Tucumán is an unlikely one.  Santa Fe has been the home of substantial economic 
dynamism in the past decade.  The province does not depend on any one industry, but 
rather combines large agroindustry (soy, sunflower, dairy and the associated processing) 
with a number of other sectors, including a substantial manufacturing base (e.g. 
automobiles and metal) and the country’s second largest port.  Additionally, political 
contestation in Santa Fe has increased in recent years and has triggered reforms of some 
regulatory agencies, including the Ministry of Labor.   
In contrast to Santa Fe, Tucumán is a backwater.  It is one of Argentina’s poorest 
provinces, and its economy is dominated by two polluting industries: sugar mills and 
citrus processing.  Tucumán’s political system is controlled by a single party (a faction of 
Peronism that follows Governor Alperovich), and there have been no meaningful reforms 
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in its government administration in recent years. Given these structural conditions, it 
would appear that the deck is stacked against Tucumán, and for many years, provincial 
regulators in the province did, indeed, fail to implement environmental regulations.  Yet, 
in 2003, Tucumán shifted paths and began to enforce regulations in key industries.  The 
following two sections compare in detail stasis in Santa Fe with change in the less-likely 
case of Tucumán. 
Firefighting in Santa Fe 
 With Santa Fe’s substantial industrial sector, many firms in the province have 
high levels of potential pollution and non-compliance is the norm, creating formable 
regulatory challenges in the province.41  Yet, there has been little in the way of systematic 
enforcement as a response to widespread noncompliance.  In 2009, officials in the Santa 
Fe Environmental Secretariat (SFSMA) estimated that they were able to inspect less than 
3% of facilities in the province each year, and they estimate that there were some 5,000 
firms that “are not totally identified” and operate completely outside of the regulatory 
system.42  When they found violations, inspectors had difficulty taking steps that could 
alter firm behavior.  For example, the process of using fines was often blocked.  Out of 
the inspected firms in 2008, upwards of 50% were issued notices of non-compliance, but 
only 5% were issued penalties.43  These enforcement outputs are not what regulators 
would prefer; an official explained:  
“What we would like to do…is to plan inspections with the most frequency 
for the most risky firms, and with less frequency for the less risky firms in 
order to understand their main emissions…and to remediate or prevent 
any problems.  [To be]…beyond the complaints that are always going to 
exist.  But today we are still behind on this, and we are acting more as 
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firefighters…with complaints, and with judicial requests that have to be 
answered immediately.”44 
The SFSMA was not, however, a completely crippled agency.  When there was social 
pressure over pollution in a specific community, regulators were able to take action.  One 
inspector described the differences in the regulators’ capabilities when there is conflict,  
“We can demand more because the firms feel very pressured because there can be a 
protest and blockade of the plant so that no one can go to work.  Everything functions 
like that here.”45 In other words, regulators spent much of their time acting as 
“firefighters,” resolving piecemeal conflicts before they became destabilizing. 
The case of the Santa Clara Plant, which processes soy and sunflower seeds to 
produce vegetable oil in the city of Rosario, illustrates how regulators resolve conflicts.46 
This plant’s processes result in a variety of pollutants that need to be mitigated to comply 
with regulations.47  For years, inspectors from the SFSMA were well aware of the 
environmental problems caused by Santa Clara, which were common in the industry, but 
they were largely unable to take steps that would lead to compliance.  According to 
inspectors, Santa Clara’s air “emissions were very bad because they were burning 
sunflower seed shells to fire the boiler, which created high levels of particulates and 
noise.  We confirmed all of this ourselves.  As always, we required changes, but there 
were no sanctions.  We required the changes again, and there were no sanctions again.  
It was a closed loop.”48  A former Secretary of Environment recounted, “The state…was 
not complying with its own rules to apply sanctions and implement legislation.”49  In 
short, Santa Clara, like many of the cereal processing facilities in Santa Fe, was causing 
serious environmental damage and violating laws, and responses from regulators did little 
to mitigate the pollution or promote upgrading.50 
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The trigger for change in this case was literally a series of fires and explosions 
that began in April 2004 in the Santa Clara plant.51  These incidents frightened nearby 
residents and spurred mobilization.52  Further stoking the conflict were health officials 
from a local clinic who revealed to the press that there had been disproportionately high 
rates of asthma in the neighborhood near the plant.53  Local leaders protested and plant 
managers feared that the community would demand that the facility be closed down.54 
According to regulators, “the pressure of the neighbors was so strong that the firm had to 
solve the problems, or the plant could not keep working.”55  
Regulators in the SFSMA were able to leverage the resources generated by the 
conflict and to enforce regulations.  Forming linkages with community organizations and 
municipal officials, the SFSMA conducted joint inspections that identified the violations 
in the plant.56  According to neighbors, “when environmental officials come to inspect the 
plant, we go to the plant as well.”57  Residents called this a system of “neighborhood 
monitors.”58  The SFSMA became “a mediator, demanding actions from the plant 
and…monitoring the plant to make sure the changes were adequate.”59  Santa Clara 
presented a plan of action to reduce pollution and come into compliance with regulations 
over a two-year period.60  The process was anything but smooth, but this form of 
enforcing regulations with tight interactions between the SFSMA and the community 
pushed the firm to invest over two million dollars and complete the proposed projects.61   
The results were surprisingly successful.  From the point of view of the regulators, 
Santa Clara was a rare instance in which enforcement actually worked.  “After two long 
years, a lot of tolerance from the neighbors, an effort from the firm, and an effort from us 
acting in between those two groups, Santa Clara managed to fix the emissions and made 
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many improvements.”62  Representatives from the community recognized both 
environmental and health improvements,63 and leaders from a professional environmental 
organization saw the efforts as a “positive case” that resulted in “many environmental 
improvements.”64  For managers at Santa Clara, the transformed relationship with the 
community had long-term benefits.  Managers stopped worrying about the plant being 
shut down because of popular pressure and were actually able to get support from their 
neighbors on future modifications—the “cherry on the cake” of conflict mitigation 
according to plant managers.65  Thus, regulation in this case was rewarding in a sense that 
a conflict over pollution that could have led to a firm closure instead resulted in 
continued operation of industry with fewer negative impacts on its community. 
The conflict around Santa Clara was not unique; there were similar cases of 
mobilization triggering enforcement in other parts of the province.66  However, regulators 
never were able to scale up their efforts and induce investments in pollution reduction at 
an industry level.  There were many other similar plants with the same types of violations 
that regulators did not even inspect, let alone push to upgrade.  And there were conflicts 
that led to shutting down firms instead of mitigating pollution and while generating 
economic activity.67  As a result, immediate social pressure was more important than 
policy in driving firm behavior, and chaotic regulation remained stable.  
Explaining Persistent Firefighting in Santa Fe 
 What accounts for this pattern of enforcement in Santa Fe?  Among the 
immediate causes is a weakness in the internal components of state capacity.  The 
SFSMA had an extremely small staff considering the sheer size of Santa Fe and the 
number of sites that needed to be controlled;68 as officials noted, “with so few people, we 
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react according to necessity”69 with “little margin” for proactive measures.70  At a basic 
level, the inspectors lacked the materials they needed to organize and execute the tasks of 
enforcement; they had access only to one or two cars, and inspectors said they often “had 
to pay for the gasoline [out of pocket]…to be able to get to the inspection site.”71  
Moreover, there were limitations in information technology, and there was only one 
laboratory in the province.72  Although other regulatory agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Labor, expanded in the post-crisis period, the SFSMA remained underfunded.73   
 Despite such limited internal resources, regulators could still respond to conflicts.  
In the Santa Clara case, as in others, regulators leveraged resources from mobilized civil 
society organizations.  Mobilized community groups created skirmishes that demanded a 
reaction; a former agency head stated, “When there was a high-conflict issue, it was 
necessary to give a response…to defend the government so it isn’t criticized [and] so 
they don’t fire me.”74  Even with few internal resources, regulators could attend to a 
handful of fires.  Moreover, community groups and municipal governments assisted the 
SFSMA operationally by monitoring the behavior of firms, often through the creation of 
a local “commission” that formalized linkages between state and society.75  In short, even 
with weak internal resources, the creation of linkages to mobilized groups made 
enforcement happen. 
 Why did the internal components of state capacity remain underdeveloped?  A 
full account will only be possible in comparison to Tucumán, but it is helpful to consider 
some hypotheses.  One might be that environmental organizations were exceedingly 
weak.  However, in comparison with other provinces, including Tucumán, Santa Fe had a 
relatively well-developed environmental movement.  There were a large number of 
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professionalized environmental organizations in the province.76  Moreover, these 
environmental groups were organized into a coalition (the Socio-Environmental Agenda) 
that combined forces of the movement to advocate for stronger environmental protection, 
including moving towards a strategic approach to enforcement.77  On some fronts the 
environmental groups were successful.  For instance, they effectively removed a 
secretary of environment whom they accused of being too close to polluting industry.78  
Still, these organizations clearly were unable to persuade politicians to follow their 
interests and invest resources in the SFSMA.   
Firms, for their part, did not advocate for or against the SFSMA.  A senior official 
in the federation of industry associations explained that in the 1990s, the federation 
“made a proposal, which we presented in the legislature, for the creation of an 
Environmental Secretariat” that eventually passed.79  Industry wanted an “agency that 
was serious,” one  that could handle conflicts and offer  “judicial security.”  But when 
the economy suffered after the 2001 crisis, industry could no longer “prioritize” 
investment in environmental institutions.  In contrast to accounts of environmental 
politics that pit firms against regulators, the main industrial association in Santa Fe held a 
largely neutral position towards the SFSMA, which is not surprising given its role in 
mediating conflicts.   
The example of Santa Clara helps clarify why industry was ambivalent about 
providing more resources in the SFSMA.  Industry wanted legal certainty from regulators. 
The SFSMA was able to provide some margin of certainty by putting out fires like the 
one around Santa Clara, even with extremely limited staff.  This suggests that successful 
firefighting can actually undermine industry support for institutional strengthening. 
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Without a conflict that requires a systematic response from the state, industry will not 
prioritize investment in the regulatory agency.  
Shifting Patterns in Tucumán, the Garden of the Republic 
Located in the northwest of Argentina, the province of Tucumán, known as the 
“garden of the republic,” faces a series of environmental challenges from agroindustry.  
The dominant sectors in the province are citrus (processing lemons for export) and sugar 
mills (producing sugar and ethanol), both of which are highly polluting.80  From the 
1990s until the early 2000s, environmental laws existed on the books, but violations were 
widespread and the state did little to guide firm behavior.  The government agency 
responsible for controlling pollution from industry was the Ministry of Health (Sistema 
Provincial de Salud, SIPROSA).  Although the exact number fluctuated over time, 
SIPROSA had approximately thirteen inspectors tasked with enforcement.  These 
inspectors regularly took samples from the pollution emitted by the largest firms and 
identified levels of contaminants.   
The regulatory system, however, was completely ineffective.  Invariably, 
inspectors found pollutants in excess of legal limits, but they were unable to penalize 
those responsible or to enable firms to comply through instruction.  An official explained 
the difficulties, “What happens is that the system of fines hasn’t been applied as it 
should…there would be a delay of at least five years before the fine was completely 
[processed].”81  The regulatory system was full of weak points that could be exploited by 
firms with capable lawyers and political connections.82  For example, an official explains 
how it was politically impossible to close down polluting firms in the sugar industry:  
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“Once the mill is going, it is very hard to close it because it is the 
economic base of Tucumán. Therefore, you have to be very careful 
because if you aren’t, the society is going to come on top of you.  For 
environmental issues, it isn’t just complying with laws. It is achieving an 
equilibrium between the laws and what firms are able to do.”83 
That “equilibrium” meant, for many years, allowing sugar mills to violate laws with 
impunity.  The citrus industry largely followed the same pattern.  The firms would be 
inspected, SIPROSA would find violations, and then nothing would happen.84 Apart from 
sanctions, inspectors did little to take pedagogical actions that could help firms upgrade.  
In fact, regulators had few direct interactions with firms.  Instead, they mostly took 
samples and issued violations without engaging in discussions of the underlying causes of 
pollution.   
Even after over ten years of regulation and the passage of various national and 
provincial laws, violations continued and there were very low levels of enforcement. 
Overall, pollution increased dramatically in the province at the end of the 1990s and 
beginning of the 2000s. The citrus industry grew nearly fourfold; sugar mills responded 
to increases in natural gas prices by switching to polluting biofuels without installing air 
filters; and incentives for ethanol production pushed more sugar mills to add large 
distilleries that increased water pollution.  It was clear from scores of interviews with 
business leaders, regulators, and environmental groups that not a single firm complied 
with regulations during this period.  Some firms took steps to reduce contamination, but 
these changes were driven largely by external market demands, not by regulatory 
policy.85  
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Mobilization Against Pollution 
In the early 2000’s, political pressure to reduce pollution began to increase.  In 
comparison with Santa Fe, there were fewer professional organizations advocating for 
environmental protection broadly.86  However, in a form similar to Santa Fe, there was a 
series of mobilized community groups that fought against contamination from sugar mills 
and citrus plants in their towns.87  One group, formed in the beginning of 2003, was 
UniVec (Union de Vecinos del Sur), located in the town of La Trinidad, where pollution 
levels from a nearby sugar mill increased substantially, blanketing the town with soot.  
Two neighbors, both school teachers, started lodging complaints about the increase in 
pollution with a wide range of government agencies and politicians.88  Eventually, they 
took their complaints to the street:  
“We gathered all of the ash from the house of my neighbor...We put it all 
in a container, put it in a wheelbarrow, and made a poster that said 
‘There Is No Right To Pollute.’  We went—my neighbor and our wives and 
kids…this wasn’t a big mobilization—through the central streets of the 
town, calling to everyone that we were taking the ash and returning it to 
the mill. From that moment, it was public, and that allowed neighbors in 
other places where mills are located to connect with us.”89 
The incident generated news stories in the local press and made the two neighbors focal 
points in the conflict against the pollution from the local mill.90 These types of 
mobilizations were very similar to those that engendered a firefighting response from 
regulators in Santa Fe and in other provinces.   
Pressure to clean up Tucumán’s environmental act, however, did not end with 
small community mobilizations and demands from professional environmental groups.  
Towards the end of the 1990s, there was an external shock, the first in a series, that came 
from a neighboring province, Santiago del Estero, which was receiving pollution in the 
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Rio Salí from Tucumán’s industry.   Officials in Santiago del Estero took the province of 
Tucumán to Federal court hoping to compel it enforce its own environmental laws.91  
And the national government became somewhat involved, especially after President 
Néstor Kirchner appointed a lawyer with a record of arguing for environmental groups to 
lead the federal environmental agency.92  These actions threatened industry even if the 
federal government could not directly regulate firms in Tucumán (the province retained 
jurisdiction, and in other similar cases in Argentina, such as the Riachuelo Watershed in 
Buenos Aires, federal court orders proved to have limited immediate effect).  
Conflict that could not be resolved in institutions spilled out onto the streets when 
fish kills in a lake at the border between the provinces made the consequences of water 
contamination highly visible.93  Large protests broke out in the town in Santiago del 
Estero on the border with Tucumán, including blockades of the roads that link Tucumán 
to the markets and ports in Buenos Aires and Rosario.94  These actions reinforced the 
external pressure on the entire industries.95  Unrest and road blocks were seen by industry 
leaders in Tucumán as a serious threat that could disrupt exports of citrus goods and 
shipments of sugar—not for just one firm, but for all.96    
An additional major force from outside the provincial regulatory institutions came 
through the judiciary.97  A new federal district attorney, Antonio Gustavo Gómez, began 
a campaign against violations of environmental law, taking over sixty cases to court, 
including the citrus and sugar industries. 98  A senior official in the Environment 
Department described the change. “For many years, the environmental problems, the 
fines and the rest, they were managed politically.  There would not be effective fines, or 
the fines would be suspended, or they would only collect minimum fines, these kinds of 
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things.  Then the Federal prosecutor came into the picture, and… things began to get 
complicated because they left the borders of Tucumán.”99 Whereas SIPROSA lacked 
teeth, Gómez was all bite; he charged the directors of firms personally with 
environmental crimes, scaring and embarrassing people of power.  Unlike the equilibrium 
sought by SIPROSA, Gómez had no problem with shutting down entire industries if they 
could not comply.  As a federal prosecutor, locally powerful political actors, such as 
firms owners, were limited in their ability to fight back against Gómez.   
 Furthering the role of the courts, the Federation of Environmental Non-
Governmental Organizations (FA) in Tucumán filed a lawsuit against all of the sugar 
mills for non-compliance with air pollution regulations.  The FA effectively bypassed the 
regulators, who they believed would protect firms, and took on the firms directly through 
a civil action.100  Three of the mills settled with the FA and agreed to install filters.  For 
the rest of the mills, there was an extended legal battle that the FA eventually won in 
2008.  This was a serious victory for the FA against the powerful industry.101  In 
combination with the lawsuits of Gómez, the FA’s civil action circumvented regulatory 
institutions and directly threatened the firms. 
 In sum, mobilization against pollution in Tucumán took a qualitatively different 
shape from the one in Santa Fe.  There were flare-ups of unrest around specific 
communities and firms, but there was also a series of pressures that threatened all firms in 
the citrus and sugar industries.  This combination of flare-ups and pressures put these 
industries into a crisis in which their licenses to operate were threatened.  
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Shifting Regulatory Patterns and Investment in State Capacity 
The provincial government of Tucumán could have taken a number of courses of 
action in light of the conflict around pollution.  Regulators could have put out as many 
fires as possible, mediating conflicts between individual firms and communities where 
there were disruptive mobilizations without taking further steps (as in Santa Fe).  
Alternatively, regulators could have stepped back while the courts slowly worked through 
their process since court orders could be met with a pro forma response that would 
simply defend the politically powerful industries (such as claiming that firms were 
complying with regulations even if they were not).102  Any of these reactions would have 
been possible without any real investment in state capacity, and scarce resources would 
not have to be allocated to environmental regulators.   
The consequences of either of these paths would have been further increases in 
pollution levels.  In addition, firms would have been left on their own to defend their 
social licenses to operate without state support, a highly risky situation.  Blocked from 
changing the laws,103 industry saw that its back was against the wall.  Although firms had 
been successful in the past in resisting pressures, there was a perception (whether or not it 
was warranted) among leading industrialists that the questions were when and how, not 
whether, they would have to change.  A leader in the industry summed up the challenge 
this way. “The idea was that we would have sugar as cheap as in a village in Africa and 
production methods as clean as the highest level of the first world...which generated a 
very difficult situation.   Eventually “[we] have to comply or we will be shut down.” 104  
Compared with facing the onslaught of social mobilization and prosecution on 
their own, the prospect of more capable state regulators presented substantial advantages 
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to industry (given the constraint that they could not diffuse mobilization or rewrite the 
laws).  On the one hand, the firms needed help figuring out how to deal with the new 
demands.  For some issues, such as air pollution from boilers in the sugar mills, the 
technical solution was fairly clear, only requiring investment in technologies and 
operating costs.  For other issues, such as treatment of water pollutants, even leaders in 
the industry did not know what solution might work in a cost effective way.  At the 
beginning of the 2000s, most firms did not have environmental managers or engineers 
with training in pollution mitigation.  On the other hand, firms also wanted regulators to 
provide them with protection from the coming social pressure (exercised through the 
courts and in the street) while they looked for a solution.  All the firms in the citrus and 
sugar industries (not just those located next to mobilized communities) were threatened.  
Anything that could buy the firms time to upgrade progressively instead of forcing 
changes all at once would help them survive.   
When the support from firms for increased regulatory capacity was combined 
with demands from environmental groups (which had always wanted the state to take its 
enforcement role more seriously), the provincial government began to invest in internal 
components of state capacity.  The first program was the Provincial Plan for Clean 
Production (Plan Provincial de Producción Limpia, or PPL), by which the province 
signed agreements with firms to implement pollution prevention technologies and 
management systems.105  Though the program was created at the end of 2001, it did not 
really begin until the economy reactivated in 2003.  The PPL created a new specialized 
group of technical staff called the Center of PPL, which was jointly run through a 
collaboration between the Federal government, provincial government, and the National 
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University of Tucumán.  The Center of PPL hired a team of twelve young engineers to 
oversee implementation of the program (on top of the existing staff at SIPROSA, which 
remained), thereby dramatically expanding internal component of state capacity for 
regulation.106   
With the PPL, regulators responded to both of the immediate needs of industry.  
First, the PPL staff audited environmental management in the firms in order to identify 
changes that would reduce waste generation, water consumption, and energy use.  They 
gave free consulting advice to the firms (many of which did not have in-house expertise 
in environmental management), looking for “win-wins” that immediately made pollution 
prevention pay.  Through the process of the PPL some firms saw benefits, as a manager 
explained “We started with the problems of order and housekeeping.  From there, we 
started to find lots of things, such as the waste of oils, products, and paper.”107  The 
accumulation of these efforts led to real benefit for some firms.  For example, the sugar 
mill, Marapa, increased energy efficiency with a savings of over $100,000 and invested 
in better filtration systems that reduced pollution, as well as waste, with a three-year 
payback.  The citrus firm Citrusvil reported improving efficiencies in their operations to 
reduce the use of sodium hydroxide saving thousands of dollars in the process.  And the 
citrus firm Citromax improved water efficiency to reduce usage, and costs, by 5%.108  
Regulators also encouraged firms to collaborate with one another, and with the state, in 
search of better technical solutions to the root causes of pollution.  In addition, the PPL 
brought in experts outside of the province to talk about environmental management with 
industry.  The result of these actions was the formation of thick ties between regulators 
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and firms that enabled the state to extend its ability to assist firms in finding solutions to 
pollution challenges. 
Second, the PPL offered firms a degree of legal certainty by shielding them from 
prosecution while they tried to improve their performance.  A senior official who was 
involved in the PPL described the informal exchange.  “There was a verbal commitment 
that while a firm is in the PPL, it would not be penalized.  This was a commitment 
absolutely outside of the law because the agreements could not modify the law.”109  A 
manager at a citrus firm described the importance of the plan: 
“[The regulators] knew no one could comply with the legislation.  It was 
for that reason that they established the PPL, and that is why we were part 
of the project…We could say [to the courts and environmental groups] 
‘well, we are working, we are in the PPL, we are doing things, but we still 
haven’t gotten to the pollution levels, but we are looking for a better 
technology.’  With this, the PPL helped us, it was a commitment to really 
find a solution.”110 
In sum, the PPL mitigated the costs of regulated firms through customized technical 
assistance from regulators that helped firms figure out how to reduce pollution, as well as 
through the creation of the program that gave firms a workable schedule to install 
upgrades and change processes.  Thus, the enforcement process was categorically 
different than the image of regulatory unreasonableness or rigidity that is often blamed 
for perverse economic outcomes.111 
Although the PPL took a step forward by investing in state capacity and by 
shifting the pattern of interaction between regulators and firms, the reform was 
incomplete in many ways—without penalties, many firms failed to live up to their 
agreements, and environmental groups saw the program primarily as a tool to protect the 
industry instead of as a real driver of change.  Notwithstanding these deficits, the PPL 
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was an important development because regulators were, for the first time, systematically 
monitoring the activities of the majority of sugar and citrus firms (in addition to other 
major polluters, such as a paper mill) and taking actions to help them come into 
compliance. 
The PPL was originally created as a temporary program, and as it was winding 
down in 2006 the pressure on firms to address pollution in the courts and through protests 
intensified.  In addition to direct challenges to industry, an unrelated environmental 
conflict outside of Tucumán over a paper mill in Uruguay near the Argentine city of 
Gualeguaychú signaled to many that there just might be political will to combat pollution.  
This conflict resulted in marches of over 40,000 people, a blockade of a key international 
bridge, and President Néstor Kirchner’s holding a rally attended by nineteen governors 
and the entire presidential cabinet in support of the environmentalists.112  Despite no 
direct connection with the problems in Tucumán, the unprecedented scale of the conflict 
and the supportive political response furthered concern among industry in Tucumán that 
real threats loomed for firms that did not get pollution under control.   
When the PPL formally ended in Tucumán, industry recognized the benefits from 
the program and reaffirmed its interest in improved regulatory capacity.  In the words of a 
senior official, “Firms were desperate to continue to have a refuge,” and they recognized 
that the regulators “gave them the ability to introduce environmental issues in their 
factories.”113  With industry support and help from the Federal government, Tucumán 
created the Plan of Industrial Reconversion (PRI) that included a new round of voluntary 
agreements with firms, and which brought with it another shift in the composition of the 
state bureaucracy.114 The change to the organization of the executive branch involved the 
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initiation of a process to create an Environment Department by consolidating various 
agencies involved in environmental management into one single agency.  In addition, 
replacing the staff from the Center for PPL, a new group of sixteen professionals were 
hired to implement the PRI.115  All were highly skilled (engineers and a lawyer); 
additionally, they were supported by interns who were engineering students, thereby 
making the overall level of expertise much higher than in most Argentine bureaucracies.   
In order to jointly engage in problem-solving with industry, the PRI staff needed 
access to firms in order to have open conversations about the problems facing the firms in 
reducing pollution.  This was made possible, in part, by the composition of the new staff, 
which came into the state with thick ties to the industries they had to regulate.  For 
example, the coordinator of the program had been a plant manager at some of the largest 
mills before becoming an environmental specialist.  Others had a few years of experience 
working in industry and then left to work for the state.  One senior official described his 
previous experience with the firms:  
“With the people who manage the firms, there is a relationship of trust, 
and with some of friendship.  Everyone knows me because I was 
classmates of a number of them at the university….This relationship that I 
have with the people who manage the firms has been very valuable 
because it has opened doors for me.”116 
These relationships were key for building on the existing collaboration between the state 
and the private sector that had begun in the PPL. Of course, open relationships would not 
form with every firm, but there was a clear shift away from the previous approach to 
regulation under SIPROSA.  Without reforms to augment autonomy, these changes 
opened up the regulators for even more political interference.117  In sum, the enforcement 
bureaucracy expanded its internal capacity and developed strong ties with the industry. 
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 With the creation of the PRI, conflict and demands by environmental groups for 
pollution reduction did not cease.  The actions of environmental groups provided 
additional support for investment in state capacity.  A senior official said, “All of the 
actions of the NGOs I see as opportunities to grow institutionally...to gain more 
resources.”118 In addition, as did their counterparts in Santa Fe, regulators in Tucumán 
attempted to channel demands for pollution reduction out of the streets and into the 
regulatory system. No formal advisory committees were set up, but there were informal 
channels that allowed groups, especially neighborhood groups that could mobilize 
protests and disrupt firms, direct access to the Secretary of Environment.   
From the perspective of regulators involved in the PRI, societal groups made 
valuable contributions to the process of implementing the agreements.119  For example, 
environmental organizations helped regulators gather information about firms.  As one 
official stated, “We are in constant contact with the people from the NGOs. [They say] 
‘this firm is better, this one is worse,’ or ‘look, this firm is dumping this filth into the 
river, go [inspect them].’”120  For instance, through his linkages to leaders in UniVec, the 
Secretary of Environment Alfredo Montalván met with neighbors of a mill who lived 
near a polluted stream.121  The information and support Montalván gained from his 
linkages with UniVec enhanced his ability to monitor pollution.  Community 
organizations confirmed the statements of regulators; for example, one community leader 
said that he “sits down with regulators to discuss problems, and they have never  denied 
[us] access to information.”122 Another commented that when there were conflicts, the 
Secretary of Environment “personally came” to meet with them and they had “fluid” 
contacts with regulators.123   
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There was, not surprisingly, continued strain between regulators and 
environmental groups.  On the one hand, many groups were wary about legitimizing 
programs that could give firms protection from judicial claims and did not support the 
PRI.124  On the other hand, the regulators wanted to maintain control over enforcement 
while bringing environmental groups into the process:  
“The majority of NGOs have received, from us, all of the information 
about the commitments of the firms.  Many times, the NGOs…have been 
able to, in some way, follow them from close by…The problem is that, 
because of their lack of trust, many of the NGOs want to transform 
themselves into the authority, and this is not possible.”125 
This tension allowed environmental NGOs to augment the operational capacity of the 
state while remaining a countervailing force against industry. 
In sum, there were major shifts in the internal and external components of state 
regulatory capacity in Tucumán.  First, the regulatory bureaucracy added staff and 
consolidated functions of different branches of government, augmenting the operational 
capacity of the state.  Second, through the agreements in PPL and PRI, and by virtue of 
the career backgrounds of many of the regulators, state officials formed strong ties with 
business that fostered cooperation for finding solutions to compliance challenges.  Third, 
officials worked to channel the continued actions of environmental groups into regulatory 
institutions, and thereby developed linkages with community organizations; these ties 
expanded regulators’ ability to monitor firms and created an accountability mechanism.  
Enforcement changed substantially with the shifts in state capacity.  In addition to 
gaining information from mobilized community groups, the regulators conducted a 
baseline analysis of all firms in the citrus and sugar industries, noting their effluent levels 
and technology for pollution control.  Every two months, firms sent progress reports on  
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investments they made as outlined in the agreements, and regulators conducted “patrol” 
inspections.  Constant monitoring was important because even when firms invested in 
technological fixes to contamination problems, it was necessary for firms to adapt these 
changes to their operations and maintain them over time.  In other words, enforcement 
was a key element that complemented the actions of courts and protests, which alone 
were incomplete. For example, some of the contamination problems, such as managing 
semi-solid waste from the sugar mills (cachaza), involved putting into place systems to 
ensure that wastes were carried into the fields by trucks and not dumped in rivers and 
canals.  Such a process needed constant monitoring, as it was not accepted practice in the 
industry.  Furthermore, large capital investments had to be maintained and used, as one 
regulator explained. “This mill has a beautiful boiler, new, the latest generation 
technology, and managers don’t open the water circuit [that enables the air 
filter]…because it costs money to run the water.  Thus, the mill emitted black smoke even 
though they have everything [technologically].”126 With their patrol inspections and ties 
to the community, regulators were able to stay on top of all firms in the industry and 
identify those that were backsliding. 
Not only had regulation in the sector progressed to the point where regulators 
were periodically visiting firms and using a variety of tools to induce compliance, but by 
using their linkages, regulators and the firms were building their capacity together.  One 
mechanism the inspectors used was information diffusion.  The director of environmental 
health and safety in a large sugar mill described the benefits of the regulators: “They have 
more information from a variety of industries and are able to solve punctual problems 
when I don’t have access to the information myself.  There is a technology transfer.”127 
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This view of the enforcement process was widely shared.  The environmental specialist 
for a citrus plant recounted “the regulators see what is happening in different industries 
and have more of a global view of the situation.  At the end of each year they present to 
the firms…showing us cutting edge advances of how firms are working on environmental 
issues.”128  For some challenges, such as processing the huge volumes of wastewater, the 
technology was not locally understood.  Some firms experimented with new forms of 
treatment, such as incinerating the pollutant vinasse and using it as a fuel, using processes 
with largely unknown results.129 An environmental manager from another citrus firm 
described her relationship with the regulators: 
“They come and do their audits, but more than anything, the regulators 
visit us to find out what is going on, to soak it in, because our processes 
are applicable to other citrus plants. Our relationship with the people 
from the PRI is pretty open.  The inspectors don’t have the knowledge and 
neither do we.  We are buying technology from abroad, and we are 
learning, and the regulators come to learn as well.”130 
In meetings between the state and the firms, each firm explained what it was doing to 
solve specific pollution problems, thereby mitigating adjustment costs by diffusing 
practices across the industry in a way the industry associations largely had not.131  Joint 
efforts were made in identifying new technologies to reduce pollution through the 
provincial government’s agricultural research agency, the Agro-Industrial Research 
Station Obispo Colombres, which is funded and overseen by the private sector.  
Representatives from the industry along with regulators took a joint trip to the University 
of Valparaiso in Chile to examine new technologies for treatment of water effluents.132  
All of these actions reduced adjustment costs.  They contrast strongly both with 
firefighting (that was dominant in Santa Fe), and with ridged implementation that relies 
entirely on creating incentives.  
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Joint-learning between regulators and the industry was supported by actual 
penalties for firms that failed to comply.   While the core of the PRI was collaborative, it 
was supported by regulatory elements that more resembled command and control than 
resembled cooperation.  In May 2007, the San Juan sugar mill had its operations 
suspended for not meeting its commitments.133  This was the first time ever that a mill 
was closed down for a period of time due to pollution.  In January 2008, the Environment 
Department closed another sugar mill, La Corona, for failure to install air filters in its 
smokestacks.134  The latter closure was supported by protests from UniVec that mobilized 
against the mill and supported the Environment Department’s action, but the former 
closure occurred even without an immediate mobilization.  A senior official in the 
Environment Department described the intent of these closures as a signal that the state is 
serious. “The state will close you…It was a clear message to the businessmen. ‘Don’t 
fuck with me.’”135  Another official described the move as a way of inducing 
cooperation.136  The closures, although temporary, were a significant change in 
environmental regulation in Tucumán.  Regulators were able to take these actions by 
using their internal capabilities to actually gather information about compliance, and by 
leveraging political backing from the environmental groups and the courts.  Firm owners 
now saw evidence that there was a real possibility they would be shut down for not 
complying, thus creating the conditions for productive regulator-firm collaboration.  This 
enforcement process is consistent with rewarding regulation--while it is important for 
regulators to enable firms to comply by educating them about how to change their 
processes and technologies, such collaborative actions alone can be insufficient.  A 
background threat of penalties can be used to get firms to the table to start the 
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conversation about how to solve problems, as well as to motivate firms that do not 
respond to assistance without strong incentives.137  
 Enforcement did more than put out a few fires; it helped tilt the balance of 
complete non-compliance in the sugar and citrus industries towards steady investment in 
pollution reduction.  By 2009, tensions reduced substantially; although the head of the 
Federation of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations remained critical of the 
Secretary of Environment, he noted that there were fewer problems, complaints, and 
conflicts than there had been in the earlier period.138  This outcome suggests that 
regulators were able to create some order in a chaotic regulatory environment.  Although 
continued pressure from regulators and communities will likely be necessary to sustain 
these changes, firms did develop capabilities to manage pollution for the first time.  One 
sugar mill hired one of the staff from PRI to open up an environmental department in the 
firm.  It was hardly unique.  A citrus firm that had been operating since the 1970s without 
any environmental specialists created a department to manage environmental issues in 
2004.139 Creating specialized offices to address environmental concerns could also very 
well be a key step in firms justifying environmental management in terms of efficiency 
and competitiveness, a process that has amplified the effect of state regulation in other 
contexts.140  
There were also concrete changes in pollution mitigation that coincided with the 
regulators’ efforts.  Before 2006, only a third of the sugar mills had a system for 
managing the pollutant cachaza, and by 2008 nearly all mills had developed cachaza 
management systems.141  Similarly, in 2005 very few mills had installed filters to reduce 
air pollution from burning bagasse.  The percentage of air emissions that were filtered 
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increased from 19% in 2006 to 62% in 2007.  By August 2009, 96% of emissions were 
filtered.  Firms also invested in experimenting with solutions, and some used short-term 
methods to reduce water pollution (vinasse) in rivers.  Overall, sugar mills reported that 
they invested nearly 50 million dollars in decreasing pollution in 2008 and 2009.   
Improvements in enforcement also coincided with concrete results in the citrus 
firms, which invested over ten million dollars in environmental management. A number 
of firms had installed more advanced pollution treatment systems, and at least two firms 
gained ISO 14,000 certifications.  One firm successfully installed a biogas system to 
power the plant, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and earning carbon offset credits to 
gain revenues from treating wastewater.142  Although the actions of regulators were one 
of many factors (such as the courts) pushing firms to comply, in this case, environmental 
regulation was clearly successful in helping induce pollution reduction and bringing firms 
closer to compliance with the laws. 
 In sum, there was a dramatic shift in Tucumán, which contrasts strongly with 
stasis in Santa Fe.  Whereas in Santa Fe regulators put out fires and made chaotic 
regulation bearable for industry, in Tucumán regulators systematically took steps to 
enable entire industries to move towards compliance.  Regulators in Tucumán not only 
penalized firms that were not complying, but they also helped identify and diffuse 
technologies and management practices that could help firms improve their 
environmental performance.  By doing so, regulators help avoid two possibilities that, in 
this case, would have been detrimental to development.  On the one hand, regulators 
could have done nothing and firms could have been powerful enough to fend off societal 
demands without reducing pollution.  If this had been the case, industry might have been 
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spared investments in pollution reduction, but with the negative effects on the community 
(as well other parts of the economy, such as the tourism industry that depends on clean 
air and water).  On the other hand, societal and court demands could have disrupted the 
entire sugar and citrus industries with road blockades (as in Gualeguaychú) or judicial 
demands that industry lacked the capability to meet (such as reducing vinasse effluent).  
In this case, pollution would have been reduced at the expense of the survival of industry.  
The leaders of major firms believed that the latter, not the former, scenario was more 
probable.143  But neither of these scenarios came to pass.  Instead, the state in Tucumán 
became a mediator of environmental conflict by taking a situation in which there were 
real threats of economic damage from widespread conflict, and translating them to 
progressive upgrading and continuous improvement.   
The gains in Tucumán are still not cause for a final celebration.  The province has 
a ways to go before it gets pollution completely under control.  Moreover, the reforms to 
the bureaucracy have not moved it further towards an autonomous regulatory agency that 
is insulated from powerful groups.144  Therefore, sustained enforcement is contingent on 
continued threats to business from mobilized groups in society and from activists pockets 
of the judiciary.  Nevertheless, there have been real changes in Tucumán and substantial 
departures from the firefighting model.  Given the weakness of environmental regulation 
in much of the world, the mechanisms that led to the marginal improvements are worthy 
of close analysis.  
Explaining the Shift in Tucumán 
 Why were regulators in Tucumán able systematically to take steps to promote 
compliance?  The most immediate answer is that Tucumán increased both the internal 
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and external components of state capacity, thereby enabling regulators to take a broad 
range of action at an industry level.  In contrast to Santa Fe, there was a larger regulatory 
staff with more expertise and greater material resources.  These changes were crucial to 
the constant monitoring.  Moreover, the strong ties regulators had to industry and 
environmental groups allowed regulators to extend their capacity; they were able to assist 
firms in upgrading their pollution control systems and to penalize laggards.  Again, this 
shift contrasted with stasis in Santa Fe, where regulators were relatively isolated from 
societal groups unless there was an immediate conflict.   
Why was there investment in the two components of state capacity in Tucumán? 
The answer lies in part in the shocks created by a combination of social mobilization and 
the action of the prosecutor.  These pressures are not, however, sufficient to account for 
the changes in Tucumán for two reasons.  First, the state could have taken any number of 
actions in response to social demands, including pure window dressing.  While the 
prosecutor and community groups could have put pressure on the firms, there was no real 
political opposition to threaten the governor (who won elections by 19 points in 2003 and 
73 points in 2007).  The economic threat of these pressures does not directly translate to a 
political threat in a political context without robust competition.  Second, and related, the 
types of investments made in state capacity did not follow from the demands of those 
mobilized most strongly against pollution—many of these groups, including the 
prosecutor, were against progressive plans that helped industry and prevented immediate 
closures of firms.  
Instead, the coalition behind the PPL and PRI was a combination of industry and 
several of the environmental groups.  This combination was enough to generate political 
 38 
support for the PPL, PRI, and eventually the reorganization of the regulatory agency.  
The counterintuitive interest that industry had for capable regulators derived from 
industry’s need for regulators who could respond to the full-scale crisis that was not 
contained in any one community (as in Santa Fe).  Ultimately, a key part of the 
explanation lies in the fact that, although firms wanted to avoid costly investments in 
environmental protection where possible, this position was separate from their interest in 
regulatory institutions that could structure conflict.  It is not that business preferred 
systematic enforcement to complete deregulation, but given the prevailing conditions of 
social conflict and that some environmental standards were set at the national level, the 
latter was off the table.  The choice, instead, was between a small regulatory agency that 
could only put out fires and a more substantial one that could help with adjustments and 
quell social unrest.  Overall, the industry begrudgingly chose the latter—the refuge from 
the chaos was sufficiently helpful to counter the possibility that regulators would push 
them on investments for pollution prevention. 
Conclusion  
 Sustainable development requires institutions that can give firms the incentives 
and ability to upgrade.  Yet, there is ample evidence that in many industrializing 
countries regulatory institutions are weak, and as a result, firms respond directly to 
unfiltered social demands.  With chaotic regulation, there are high levels of uncertainty 
for firms, low levels of pollution abatement, and few structures to help progressive 
upgrading.  As a result, trade-offs of environmental protection versus economic 
development take center stage, with environmental groups and firms locked in seemingly 
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zero-sum conflicts.  This outcome, however, is not inevitable.  Researchers working in a 
variety of countries have identified instances in which regulatory institutions have been 
able to induce upgrading that supports environmental protection and economic 
prosperity.145   
This paper explored the conditions under which there are shifts in the ability of 
the state to promote institutional strength by enforcing rules already on the books.  First, 
the argument located the first-order underpinnings of firefighting and systematic 
enforcement in combinations of internal and external components of state capacity.  This 
conceptualization helped focus attention on how politics relates to changes in both 
administrative resources and in state-society ties.  Second, the paper examined changes in 
patterns of enforcement over time in Tucumán in contrast with stasis in Santa Fe.  The 
Tucumán case was particularly puzzling because improvements to the regulatory agency 
occurred despite low levels of economic development, uncompetitive local politics, and 
economic dependence on commodity-producing (and polluting) industries.  Using the 
common frame of environmental groups and industry battling over pollution, changes in 
Tucumán seem highly unlikely—industry was politically well-positioned, environmental 
groups were marginal players, and the rule of law was highly questionable.   
In contrast, analysis of the case identified an unexpected relationship between 
conflict over pollution and the politics of strengthening institutions.  In the face of an 
industry-wide conflict, even firms that would have rather avoided investment in pollution 
abatement had an interest in stronger internal components of state regulatory capacity. 
Even if firms continue to prefer weaker regulatory laws, they can still (under some 
conditions) prefer stronger intermediaries.  The apparent contradiction in an anti-
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compliance but pro-regulator position becomes clear once we take into account the ways 
by which regulators help industry adjust to demands from society.146  Industry support in 
the case of Tucumán was critical to the development of improved state regulatory 
capacity and, ultimately, to shifting patterns of enforcement.  In addition to close ties 
with firms, continued community-level conflicts allowed regulators to build relationships 
with environmental groups, which supplemented regulators’ internal resources and ties to 
industry.  This result contrasted with the case of Santa Fe, where isolated conflicts, which 
could be addressed through firefighting, never triggered industry support for a stronger 
regulatory state.  As a result, the state remained weak and firefighting was stable.   
Strengthening regulatory institutions is by no means simple.  Analysis of the 
Argentine cases suggests that some conflicts are pathways out of chaotic regulation, 
while others are not.  Tucumán’s regulators and environmental groups benefited from the 
particular nature of pollution (which crossed provincial borders) and the role taken by the 
courts in promoting an industry-wide threat.  There are, however, examples beyond 
Argentina of industry-wide threats leading to increased state action to promote 
environmental upgrading.  For instance, in response to demands by a German ban on 
chemicals used in leather tanning, the Indian state helped “institutionalize compliance” 
with the benefit of support from industry.147  The dynamics of this and other cases 
suggest that research on regulation needs to be attentive to two related, but distinct, 
spheres of politics—the immediate conflicts between firms and communities, and the 
politics of state capacity and institutional strength.  Greater understanding of the 
pathways out of regulatory chaos can help identify new opportunities to promote 
developmental regulation in the context of weak states. 
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